The Employment Tribunal has held that the so-called ‘Bleuse principle’ does not survive Brexit, in Pejic v (1) Storm Global Ltd; (2) Ryanair DAC (link). Tom Ogg represented Ryanair DAC.
The ‘Bleuse principle’ was that the ordinary approach to territorial scope of domestic statues (e.g. Lawson v Serco) must give way to a modified approach where the right in question was a directly effective right conferred by EU law. See Bleuse v MBT Transport Ltd [2008] IRLR 264 (EAT).
Tom Ogg, assisted by (then pupil) Jack Steele, persuaded the Tribunal that post-Brexit, given the terms of section 6(3) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the Bleuse principle no longer applied. As the Tribunal put it in paragraph 82: “The Bleuse principle requires legislation to be interpreted to allow those working in the EU to enforce EU-derived rights in the courts of any Member State. In the Second Respondent’s submissions the Bleuse principle is no longer “relevant” in ascertaining the territorial scope of domestic legislation under the terms of s6(3) [of the the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018], because the Tribunal is no longer a Court within a Member State of the EU. The requirement of ensuring a system of mutual rights enforcement across Member State Courts is not relevant if the court in question is not in a Member State – and post-Brexit, Great Britain is not a Member State.” The Tribunal accept’s Tom’s submissions.
This is an important decision on the scope of EU-derived rights post-Brexit for those who live or work outside of Great Britain.
