- Linear Investments Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1369
On 29 October 2025, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Linear Investments Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1369, in which Stephen Kosmin appeared as sole counsel for the Financial Ombudsman Service.
This appeal concerned an application for judicial review of a decision of the Financial Ombudsman Service dealing with a complaint by a client of the appellant, Linear Investments Limited (“Linear”). In essence, the Ombudsman found that Linear had wrongly permitted its client, Professor Leslie Willcocks, to invest in a high-risk computer-driven trading strategy that included dealing in derivatives. Professor Willcocks should not have been classified, however, a professional investor and had no experience of trading in derivatives. The Ombudsman ordered Linear to compensate Professor Willcocks in full for the losses that he had sustained on his investment, calculated by reference to a notional investment of the same amount in a benchmark index, together with interest.
Having lost on every ground of challenge before Stacey J at first instance (R (Linear Investments Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service and Professor Leslie Willcocks [2024] EWHC 1428 (Admin)), Linear advanced three grounds of appeal. First, Linear submitted that it was entitled to rely on Professor Willcocks’ representations when accepting him as an elective professional client and that the decision of the Ombudsman to hold it liable was wrong in law and irrational. Secondly, it argued that the Ombudsman’s selection of a low-risk benchmark portfolio based upon the FTSE index for the computation of Professor Willcocks’ award was also irrational, because irrespective of whether he should have been accepted as an elective professional client, he had sought a higher risk investment. Thirdly, Linear contended that even if it was liable for having wrongly accepted Professor Willcocks as an elective professional client, the Ombudsman ought to have reduced Professor Willcocks’ award to reflect his contributory fault when setting out his trading experience to Linear.
On the first appeal ground, the Ombudsman’s decision on client classification under COBS 3.5.3R was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that Linear’s client classification assessment was inadequate in respect of both the quantitative and qualitative tests under COBS 3.5.3R. As to the qualitative test under COBS 3.5.3(1)R, Snowden LJ held: “… it is unlikely to be enough to satisfy COBS 3.5.3(1)R for a firm simply to require a client to complete a few very general tick boxes containing bald statements in relation to their trading experience and do nothing more” (see para. 74). Moreover, where Linear had been put on inquiry by “glaring” inconsistencies and omissions in the account opening forms, “the Ombudsman’s conclusion that Linear’s failure to pursue any further inquiries meant that it had not satisfied the qualitative test in COBS 3.5.3(1)R, was in my view entirely justifiable” (see para. 77).
The Court of Appeal also dismissed Linear’s second ground of appeal. The third ground of appeal was allowed and a partial quashing order limited to the quantum of the Ombudsman’s award was made.
A copy of the judgment can be accessed here.
- R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 848 and [2025] EWCA Civ 1311
Stephen Kosmin is instructed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department in the ongoing litigation concerning the proscription of Palestine Action.
On 4 July 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed an application for permission to appeal against a decision of Chamberlain J earlier that day to refuse interim relief: [2025] EWHC 1708 (Admin). The appellant had sought to prevent an order of the Secretary of State for the Home Department adding Palestine Action to the list of proscribed organisations at Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000.
The Claimant’s application came before the Court of Appeal (Lady Carr LCJ, Lewis LJ and Edis LJ) on an urgent out of hours basis at around 6 pm. Written grounds of appeal were filed at around 7.35pm. Oral submissions lasted for around an hour commencing at 8.05pm. The Court of Appeal’s judgment was delivered at 10.25pm. The appeal was dismissed with the result that Palestine Action was proscribed from 00:01 on 5 July 2025.
A copy of the judgment can be accessed here.
On 17 October 2025, the Court of Appeal (also Lady Carr LCJ, Lewis LJ and Edis LJ) handed down judgment in an appeal bought by the Secretary of State against the decision of Chamberlain J of 30 July 2025 ([2025] EWHC 2013 (Admin)). Chamberlain J had ruled, as a preliminary issue, that an application to the Secretary of State to remove Palestine Action from the list in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000, together with the right of appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission against a refusal of the application, was not an adequate alternative remedy to a claim for judicial review of the initial decision to add Palestine Action to the list in Schedule 2. The appeal was dismissed.
The Court of Appeal also clarified the time limits for applying for permission to appeal: “CPR 52.13 is not intended (and in many cases could not operate) to set the time limit within which an application for permission to appeal against a refusal by the High Court of permission to apply for judicial review. That time limit is fixed in such cases by CPR 52.8.”
A copy of the judgment can be accessed here.
